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Abstract. An analytical model of a team of well-trained human decisionmakers
executing well-defined decisionmaking tasks is presented. Each team member is
described by a two-stage model in which received information is first assessed
and then responses are selected. An information theoretic framework is used
in which bounded rationality is modeled as.a constraint on the total rate of in-
ternal processing by each decisionmaker. Optimizing and satisficing strategies
are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of organizational perfor-
mance and individual workload. The relevance of this approach to the design
and evaluation of command control and communications (C3) systems is discussed.
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INTRODUCTION maker and of the organization. Information
3 theoretic approaches to modeling human de-
A command control and communications (C ) sys- cisionmakers have a long history (Sheridan
tem is defined as the collection of equipment and Ferrell, 1974). The basic departure
and procedures used by commanders and their from previous models is in the modeling of
staff to process information, arrive at deci- the internal processing of the inputs to
sions, and communicate these decisions to the produce outputs. This processing includes
appropriate units in the organization in a not only transmission (or throughput) but
timely manner. Implicit in this definition is also internal coordination, blockage, and
the notion that the role of the human decision- internally generated information. Conse-
maker is central to the design of organizations quently, the limitations of humans as pro-
and of the C3 systems that support them, There- cessors of information and problem solvers,
fore, in order to study the properties of al- are modeled as a constraint on the total pro-
ternative designs, it is necessary to develop cessing activity. This constraint repre-
a basic model of an interacting decisionmaker. sents one interpretation of the hypothesis
Such a model, appropriate for a narrow but that decisionmakers exhibit bounded ratio-
important class of problems was introduced by nality (March, 1978).
Boettcher and Levis (1982). In this paper, the
work is extended to consider organizations The task of the organization is to receive
consisting of several decisionmakers that form signals from one or many sources, process
a team. them, and produce outputs. The outputs
could be signals or actions. Implicit in
The basic assumption is that a given task, or this model of the organization's function is
set of tasks, cannot be carried out by a single the hypothesis that decisionmaking is a two-
decisionmaker because of the large amount of stage process, The first is the assessment
information processing required and because of of the situation (SA) of the environment,
the fast tempo of operations in a tactical sit- while the second is the selection of a res-
uation. In designing an organizational struc- ponse (RS) appropriate to the situation.
ture for a team of decisionmakers, two issues
need to be resolved: who-receives what informa- The input signals that describe the environ-
tion and who is assigned to carry out which ment may come from different sources and, in
decisions. The resolution of these issues de- general, portions of the signals may be re-
pends on the limited information processing ceived by different members of the organiza-
rate of individual decisionmakers and the tem- tion. It has been shown by Stabile, Levis
po of operations. The latter reflects the rate and Hall (1982) that the general case can
at which tasks are assigned to the organization be modeled by a single vector source and a
for execution. set of partitioning matrices that distribute
components of the vector signal to the appro-
An information theoretic framework is used for priate decisionmakers within the organiza-
both the modeling of the individual decision- tion, This model is shown in Fig. 1, where
I-~-- ---
the input vector is denoted by X and takes val- In the model of the organization developed
ues from a finite alphabet Jr. The partitions in the following sections, internal decision
x may be disjoint, overlapping or, on occa- strategies for each decisionmaker are intro-
sion, identical. duced that determine the overall mapping be-
tweenthe stimulus (input) to the organization
ORGANIZATION and its response (output). The total activ-
...r itv of each DM as well as the performance
measure for the organization as a whole are
expressed then in terms of the internal de-
cision strategies. The locus of admissible
. \ Y strategies is shown in the performance-work-
_ . . . ... M load space. It is then possible to analyze
the effects of the bounded rationality con-
straints on the organization's performance
.. DM--~ · · · ·-rd-~,~f ~ i when either optimizing or satisficing behav-
ior is assumed. The results indicate that
.- -. the proposed model exhibits useful proper-
ties from the point of view of studying the
Fig. 1 The problem of information information structure of decisionmaking
structures for organizations. organizations.
The paper is organized as follows. In theMany classes of organizational structures can p
be represented by Fig. 1. Consideration in next section, the model of the interacting
this paper will be restricted to structures
that result when a specific set of interactions third section an organization consisting of
are allowed between team members, as shown in a team of two decisionmakers is described
analytically. In the fourth section, theFig. 2. In this case, each team member is as- analytically. In the fourth section, the
signed a specific task, whether it consists of optimal and the satisficing decision strate-
processing inputs received from the external gies are obtained and analyzed.
environment or from other team members, for
which he is well trained and which he performs
again and again for successively arriving in-
puts. In general, a member of the organization MODEL OF THE INTERACTING
can be represented by a two-stage model as ORGANIZATION MEMBER
shown in Fig. 2. First, he may receive signals
r from the environment that he processes in the The complete realization of the model for a
situation assessment (SA) stage to determine or single decisionmaker (DM) who is interacting
select a particular value of the variable z with other organization members and with the
that denotes the situation. He may communicate environment is shown in Fig. 3. The detail-
his assessment of the situation to other mem- ed description and analysis of this model,
bers and he may receive their assessments in as well as its relationship to previous work,
return. This supplementary information may be notably that of Drenick (1976) and Froyd and
used to modify his assessment, i.e., it may Bailey (1980), has been presented in Boettcher
lead to a different value of z. Possible alter- and Levis (1982). Therefore, only the con-
natives of action are evaluated in the response cepts and results needed to formulate the
selection (RS) stage. The outcome of this pro- model of the organization will be described
cess in the selection of a local action or de- in this section.
cision response y that may be communicated to
other team members or may form all or part of Let the environment generate a vector symbol
the organization's response. A command input x'. The DM receives x which is a noisy mea-
from other decisionmakers may affect the selec- surement of x'. The vector x takes values
tion nrocess. from a known finite alphabet Saccording to
REST OF ORGANIZATION DM 1 the probability distribution p(x). TheREST OF ORGANIZATION ROqai
quantity
SA zRO -yY RO H(x) p() log 2 p(x) (1)
is defined to be the entropy of the input
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949) measured in bits
per symbol generated. The quantity H(x) can
also be interpreted as the uncertainty re-
garding which value the random variable x
will take. If input symbols are generated
every T seconds on the average, then T, the
_x} [_i 1_ zi mean symbol interarrival time, is a descrip-
_ , _SA RS ------ Y tion of the tempo of operations (Lawson, 198)
i-th'DM The situation assessment stage consists of a
finite number of algorithms that the DM can
choose from to process the measurement x and
Fig. 2 Allowable team interactions obtain the assessed situation z. The inter-
nal decisionmaking in this stage is the
.U+J U s+j _U +j[2z'' v' g T U = IWl ~= .....,w j = 1,2,...,V (3)
q f,(z) h v) It is assumed that the algorithms have no
I u / \( _sve) variables in common:
· -( Wizn W' = ) for ij
fu>(x)tJ (-f~v~) Vi,j C {1,2,...,UT} or {1,2,...,V} (4)
The subsystem S' is described by a set of
variables
Fig. 3 Single interacting decisionmaker
Model S' 5 {u, W ... ,WU,z};
choice of algorithm f. to process x. There- A
fore, each algorithm Is considered to be ac-
tive or inactive, depending on the internal de- A = EWA _1
cision u. In this paper, it is assumed that S ,z;
the algorithms f are deterministic. This in- Bi subsystem S by
plies that once the input is known and the al-
gorithm choice is made, all other variables in SB B= {W,};
the first part of the SA stage are known.
Furthermore, because no learning takes place subsystem S" by
d-raina the performance of a sequence of tasks,
the successive values taken by the variables S" = WWU + l ....WU+V,y).
of the model are uncorrelated, i.e., the model
is memoryless. Hence, all information theore- The mutual information or transmission or
tic expressions appearing in this paper are on throughput (Shannon and Weaver, 1979) between
a per symbol basis. the inputs x, z', and v' and the output y,
denoted by T(x,z',v':y) is a description
The variable z', the supplementary situation of the input-output relationship of the DM
assessment received from other members of the model and expresses the amount by which the
organization, combines with the elements of z output y is related to the inputs x,z',and
to produce z. The variables z and 2 are of the v':
r same dimension and take values from the same = Tx vy
alphabet. The integration of the situation as- Gt = T(x,z',v':y)
sessments is accomplished by the subsystem = H(x,z',v') + H(y) - H(x,z',v',y)
SA which contains the deterministic algorithmA. H(y) - H ,(Y) (5)
If there is no command input v' from other or-
ganization members, then the response selection A quantity complementary to the throughput
strategy p(vlz) specifies the selection of one G is that part of the input information
of the algorithms hj that map z into the out-
put y. The existence of command input v} mod- which is not transmitted by the system S,
ifies the decisionmaker's choice v. A final It is called blockage and is defined as
choice v is obtained from the function b(v,v').
The latter defines a protocol according to Gb = H(x,',') - Gt (6)
which the command is used, i.e., the values of
v determined by b(v,v') reflect the degree of In this case, inputs not received or rejec-
option restriction effected by the command. The ted by the system are not taken into account.
overall process of mapping the assessed situa- Blockage can also be expressed as the mutual
tion z and the command input v' into the final information between the inputs and all the
choice'Cv is depicted by subsystem S B in Fig..3. internal variables of S conditioned on thechoice P is depicted by subsystem S in Fig. 3.
The result of this process is a response selec- output y, i.e.,
tion strategy p(VlZv') in place of p(vlZ). G T xz ,vt:u, Wl.,WU+VWAWBz,
b y
The model of the decisionmaking process shown (7)
in Fig. 3 may be viewed as a system S consisting
of four subsystems: S', the first part of the In contrast to blockage is a quantity that
-s A; . B - 'describes the uncertainty in the output when
SA stage; S ; S ; and S", the second part of the input is known. It may represent noise
the RS stage. The inputs to this system S in the output generated within S or it may
are x, z', and v' and the output is y. Further- represent information in the output produced
more, let each algorithm fi contain a. varia- by the system. It is defined as the entropy
bles denoted by of the system variables conditionedi on x,.
Wi ii wi__ _
Iwl1, w2,..wa i ,2,...,U (2) 1 The conditional entropy is defined as
and let each algorithm h. contain a! variables
denoted by J X (Z) p(x) I P(Zlx)lg 2 P(zlx)
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~-----~~3 H
that is, has been selected for processing the input
G ~ 1 U+V ,WAWB y) (8) - -x and p. is the probability that algorithm
Gn= Hx(UW ,.. ,W , ,W ,Z,Z, y) (8) hj has ieen selected, i.e., Pi = p(u=i)
The final quantity to be considered is the mu- and pj p(v=j). The quantities gk repre-
tual information of all the internal and output' sent the internal coordination of the corres-
variables of the system S. It reflects all ponding algorithms and depend on the distri-
system variable interactions and can be inter- bution of their respective inputs. The
preted as the coordination required among the quantity H is the entropy of a random vari-
system variables to accomplish the processing able that can take one of two values with
of the inputs to obtain the output y. It is probability p:
defined by
1 U+V A B H(p) - p logp - (l-p) log(l-p) (18)
Gc = T(u:w I :w, :w1:. .:wa :z:z:v:y)(9)
cV B Relation (13) states then that the total co-
ordination in system S can be decomposed in-
The Partition Law of Information (Conant, 1976) the sum of the internal coordination
states that the sum of the four quantities Gt, within each subsystem and the coordination
Gb, G, and Gc is equal to the sum on the mar- due to the interaction among the subsystems.
ginal entropies of all the system variables The subsystem coordinations are given by
(internal and output variables): Eqs. (14) to (17) while the coordination
among them is given by Eq. (18). The coor-
G = Gt + Gb + Gn+ Gc (10) dination terms for subsystems S' and S" re-
flect the presence of switching due to the
where internal decision strategies p(u) andp(vlz).
If there is no switching, i.e., if for exam-
G = H(wi) + H(u) + H(z) + H(z) ple p(u=i)=l for some i, then H will be
i,j identically zero to all pi and Eq. (14) will
+ H(v) + H(y) (11) reduce to:
' i
When the definitions for internally generated GC g (p(x)) + H(z)
information G and coordination G are applied
n c
and, similarly, Eq. (15) will reduce to:to the specific model of the decisionmaking pro-
cess shown in Fig. 3 they become G U+j )) 
gc (p (zv=J)) + H1(y).
G = H(u) + H-(v) (12)
n z Finally, the quantity G may be interpreted
and as the total information processing activity
B B 13 of system S and- therefore, it can serve as
G = G + G + G + G + T(S:S :S :S ) a measure of the workload of the organization
c c c c c member in carrying out his decisionmaling
task.
where
GI lp 9i(P  A TEAM OF TWO DECISIONMAKERS
Gc = [Pigc (p(x))+ ciH (pi)] + H(z)(14)c i
In the previous section, the information
theoretic model of a decisionmaker inter-
G = [p g (p(z=j)) acting with other members of his organization
Gc = 1j c was presented. In order to define an orga-
+ ca H(p )] + 1H(y) (15) nizational structure, it is necessary to
j -j specify exactly the interactions of each DM
A = A 16 with every other DM (if any) and the inter-
c g (p(z)) (16) actions with the environment. Then the
B B Partition Law of Information can be applied
Cc = sc (p(z)) (17) to each DM. The expressions for total pro-
cessing activity G and for its components
( A B can be derived then either from basic prin-
ciples, or by specializing the expressions
+ T (x':z') + T-(x',z':v') developed-in the previous section. To
z z demonstrate the procedure and, at the same
(18) time, keep the exposition brief, an orga-
nization consisting of two interacting deci-
The expression for G shows that it depends on
n isionmakers will be analyzed.
the two internal strategies p(u) and p(viz)
even though a command input may exist. This
implies that the command inDut v' modifies the The specific organizational structure isshown in Fig. 4, Both decisionmakers #1 and
DM's internal decision after p(vJz) has been #2 receive synchronized signals from the
determined. environment -- they receive different parti-
tions of the input X to the organization.
In the expressions defining the system coordi- tions of the input X to the organization.is the probability th t li f Each member processes the external input
nation Pi is the probability that algorithm fi through one of his algorithms fi to obtain
his partial assessment z of the external siua- 12 1
tion. The partial assessments are then com- G H(x ,z ) -G (21)
12 21 b
municated to each other (variables z and z1
in Fig. 4). 1The first DM obtains his modified 1 Hu + H (22)
assessment z and then selects a response which 1 1
is, in this case, a command input to the second Z
DM. The latter receives the command input v' 1
and, on the basis of that and his of nied 1 mie d + at H )
situation assessment z ,selects a response. The =
result is the output Y of the organization. 1 21 A 1
+ H(z ,z ) + gc(p(z ),p ( z12 ) )
This particular configuration can be interpreted 1
as follows: The second DM receives detailed
observations about a small portion of the en- [pg(p(z v ) + a H(p)]
vironment on which he has to act. He sends his j=l 
estimate of the situation to the first D!M two
has a broad view of the situation. (DM1 may be 1 -1
receiving situation assessments from other DMs + (v') + (H(z + H(z
that interact with him in the same way as DM2). +T (x :z
12) (23)
Then DM1 selects an overall strategy and co=- z
municates that to DM2 (and to all others). This
Decisionmaker # 2
signal, v', restricts the option selection of
DM2 to be consistent with the overall strategy 2 2 21 , 12 (242 = T(x ,z ,v' :z ,y) (24)
determined by DM1
-
Finally, DM2 generates a 2 2 21 2
response to his (local) situation input that G2 H(x z ,v) G2 (25)
has been improved by the information he has re-
ceived from DM. 2 2 2
1ceived from M1. G2 = H(u) + H 2 (v
2 ) (26)
n _2
The five quantities that characterize the infor- 2 z
mnation processing and decisionmaking activity G2 = + 2 H(Pi)
of each decisionmaker are obtained directly by i i c
specializing Eqs. (5), (6), (12)-(18). The basic 2
assumption that allows the derivations of the + (z2 12 A 2 (p21
various expressions is that the graph showing c
the interactions between the DMs is acyclical. B2 2
+ gc (p(z ),p(v'))
Decisionmaker #1 2
2 l12 -2
1 1 12 21 +- [ (p(z2 Iv2)) + Oj H(pj) ]
T(x , z v) (20) t c 
:isara I~sa~~·iaraaarn~'t sZ v P=1
2 -2 -2 -2 A pair of pure strategies, one for DM1 and+ H(Y) + H(z ) + H(z ) + H(z ,v 1
2 21 2 21 one for DM2, defines a pure strategy for the
+ T 2 (x :z ) + T_2(x ,z :v') (27) organization:
z z
1 2
It follows from expressions (20) to (27) that ij = {Di D (32)
the interactions affect the total activity G
of each DM. At the same time, these inter-
of each D. At the sae time, these inter- Independent internal decision strategies for
actions model the control that is exerted by each DM whether pure or mixed induce a
the DMs on each other. These controls are ' (
exerted either directly through the command behavioral strategy (Owen, 1968) for the
inputs v' or indirectly through z12 and z2 1. organization
fD 1A l ), D2=P ) (33)Both decisionmakers in Fig. 4 are subject to {D k , D2(p)}
indirect control. The supplementary situation Given such a behavioral strategy, it is then
12 1 Given such a behavioral strategy, it is then
assessment z modifies the assessment z to possible to compute the total processing
-1 -1 activity G for each DM:produce the final assessment z . Since z af-
fects the choice of output, it follows that DM2 G1 = G1(E) ; G2 = G2(A)
=G (A'); G = C (A) (34)
has influenced the response of DM1. Similarly,
DM1, influences through z
2 1 the response of DM2. Alternatively, the distributions on u and v
can be specified directly for each decision-
maker. This results in a set of behavioralDirect control is exerted through the command maker. This results in a set of behavioral
input from DM1 to DM2 . The variable v' modi- strategies for the organization.
fies the response selection strategy p(v2 z2) b = p )(v 
directly. Both direct and indirect control may
improve the performance of a DM; they can also (35)
degrade it.
that includes the set specified by Eq.(33)
as well as strategies that are not inducedThe values of the total processing activities as well as strategies that are not induced
1 2 by mixed internal decision strategies for
G and G depend on the choice of internal de- each DM. Then, the total activity G can be
cision strategies adopted by DM1 and DM2. De- computed from
fine a pure internal decision strategy to be 1 1 2 2
one for which both the situation assessment b G =Gb (36)
strategy p(u) and the response selection stra- T
tegy p(vjz) are pure, i.e., an algorithm f. is Iese interpretations of the expressions for
i the total activity are particularly useful
selected with probability one, and an algorithm in modeling the bounded rationality con-
h. is selected is selected with probability one straint for each decisionmaker and in ana-
y- lvzing the organization's performance inwhen the situation is assessed as being some z: l ng the organization
the performance-workload space.
1 -,1 -, --1. 
Di '(v z=z ) (28) BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND PERFORPAINCE
for some i', for some j' and for each z. Simi- LTION
iarly, 
l -ar', The qualitative notion that the rationality
2 = 2 -2 (29 of a human decisionmaker is not perfect, but
3D m is bounded, has been modeled as a constraint
There are n1 = Ul (VY possible pure internal on the total activity G:
decision strategies for DM1 and n2 = U2.(V2)
M G. = 
~1 2 ~~~~G G= G G + G+ G < F (37)
for DM2. The quantity M is the size of the al-
phabet of z. where T is the mean symbol interarrival time
and F the maximum rate of information pro-
All other internal decision strategies are mixed cessing that characterizes decisionmaker i
(Owen, 1968) and are obtained as a convex combi- This Constraint implies that the decisiont
nation of pure strategies: maker must process his inputs at a rate that
it as least equal to the rate with which they
mn arrive. For a detailed discussion of this
k Pk Dk (30) Boettcher and Levis (1982).
no As stated earlier, the task of the organiza-
2 (P ) = E P D2 tion has been modeled as receiving inputs X'
D= Pl D (3 and producing outputs Y. Now, let Y' be the
desired response to the input X' and let
where k and are probabilities. L(X') be a function or a table that associa-
tes a Y' with each member of the input X'.
The organization's actual response Y can be The total activity Gi of decisionmaker i is
compared to the desired response Y' using a a convex function of the A in the sense that
function d(Y,Y') which assigns a cost to
each possible pair (Y,Y'). The expected value G (A) > L GC k)PkPt
of the cost can be obtained by averaging over k,1
all possible inputs. This value, computed as where A is defined in Eq. (32). An equiva-
a function of the organization's decision stra- is defined in Eq. (32). An equiva-
tegy , can serve as a performance index J. F6r lent representation of A is obtained from
example, if the function d(Y,Y') takes the Eqs. (32) and (33):
value of zero when the actual response matches
the desired response and the value of unity A = A kZ PkPZ (40)
otherwise, then k,1
which describes the relative occurence of each
(A) = Efd(Y,Y')l = p(Y#Y') (38) pure organization strategy AkL.
which represents the probability of the organi- The result in Eq. (39) follows from the def-
zation making the wrong decision in response inition of Gi as the sum of the marginal
to inputs X. entropies of each system variable, Eq. (11),
and the fact that the possible distributions
_ SA _ R  _ p(w), where w is any system variable, are
elements of a convex distribution space deter-
mined by the organization decision strate-
_ __ gies, i.e.,
_ p(w) £ {p(w)IP(w) = p(wlAkt)pkPt (41)
k,1
The performance index of the organization can
also be obtained as a function of A. Corre-
sponding to each Akl is a value Jkl of the per-
y' LJ formance index. Since any organization strat-
egy being considered is a weighted sum of
Fig. 5 Performapne evaluation of pure strategies, Eq. (40), the organization's
organization performance can be expressed as
The information obtained from evaluating the
performance of a specific structure and the Jo) = L Jke k Pe. (42)
associated decision strategies can be used by k,P
the organization designer in defining and al-
locating tasks (selecting the partitioning
matrices 7Ti) and in changing the number and Equations (39) and (42) are parametric in the
contents of the situation assessment and res- probabilities p and p The locus of all
ponse selection algorithms. 2
admissible (J,G ,G ) triples can be obtained
The complete model of the team of two decision- by constructing first all binary variations
makers with bounded rationality is shown in between pure strategies; each binaryvaria-
Fig. 5. Two problems can be defined: tion defines a line in the three dimensional
space (J,G1,G ). These binary variations for
(a) Determine the strategies that a specific realization of the model in Fig.4
minimize J; aredrawn in Fig. 6. Each decisionmaker has
only two pure strategies. Therefore, there
(b) Determine the set of strategies are four triples that correspond to these
for which J < J. pure strategies and four lines that join them
under the assumption that one decisionmaker's
The first is an optimization problem while the pure strategy remains fixed while the other
latter is formulated so as to obtain satisfic- one considers variations between his two pure
ing strategies with respect to a performance strategies.
threshold J. Since the bounded rationality
constraint for both DMs depends on T, the inter- For this particular example, the second deci-
nal decision strategies of each DM will also sionmaker's strategy does not affect the work-
depend on the tempo of operations. The uncon- load or total processing of the first DM; how-
strained case can be thought of as the limit- ever, the first DM affects both performance
ing case when T ' A. and the total activity of the second deci-
sionmaker through his command or direct con-
A useful way of describing the properties of trol input. These properties are seen more
the solutions to the two problems is by intro- closely if the locus of admissible triples is
ducing the performance-workload space (J1GlG
2), projected on the (J,G1) and the (J,G2) planes.
The locus of the admissible triples (J,G ,Gz) The results for the second decisionmaker are
is determine by analyzing the functional depen- shown in Fig.7; similar results are obtained
dence of J, G1, and G2 on the organizationstra- for DM1. As expected, these figures are simi-
tegy A, Eq. (33). lar to the ones obtained from the analysis of a
the constraint for DM 1 is a plane parallel to
(D' ,D,) the G2 axis and intersecting the G axis at
7 1 1 1 1
G = F T with G < G
r - 2
Similarly, the constraint for DM2 is a plane
2 22 2
that-intersects the G axis at G sF T. For
r
fixed values of Fm, the bounded rationality
constraint is proportional to the tempo of
operations. As the tempo of operations in-
creases the Gi become smaller and fewer of
the potential strategies are feasible.
The solutions of the satisficing problem can
be characterized as that subset of feasible
solutions for which
c·:,~~~~~s 0(A3) = | J k Pkpt < (43)
, I ] k,-
The condition (43) defines a plane in the
(JG ,G ) space that is parallel to the
(G ,G ) plane and intersects the J axis at J.
All points on the locus below this plane,
which also satisfy the bounded rationality
constraints, are satisficing strategies.
Fig. 6 The locus of binary variations While an infinite number of strategies can be
of pure strategies for a team satisficing, the difference in total activity
of two decisionmakers with two between them can be quite large. This is
pure strategies each shown in the shaded region in Fig.7. The meth-
od of analysis presented in this paper is
readily extendable to teams of N decision-
makers whose interconnections can be repre-
sented by an acyclical graph.
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